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Abstract
In this paper we present several fuzzy logics trying to capture different no-
tions of necessity (in the sense of Possibility theory) for Go¨del logic formu-
las. Based on different characterizations of necessity measures on fuzzy sets, a
group of logics with Kripke style semantics are built over a restricted language,
namely a two level language composed of non-modal and modal formulas, the
latter moreover not allowing for nested applications of the modal operator N .
Completeness and some computational complexity results are shown.
Keywords: Posibilistic Logic, Necessity Measures, Go¨del Logic, Fuzzy Logic
1. Introduction
The handling and modelling of uncertainty is a key issue in artificial intel-
ligence reasoning tasks. The most general notion of uncertainty is captured
by monotone set functions with two natural boundary conditions. In the lit-
erature, these functions have received several names, like Sugeno measures [34]
or plausibility measures [28]. Many popular uncertainty measures, like proba-
bilities, upper and lower probabilities, Dempster-Shafer plausibility and belief
functions, or possibility and necessity measures, can be seen as particular classes
of Sugeno measures.
In this paper, we specially focus on possibilistic models of uncertainty. A
possibility measure on a Boolean algebra of events U = (U,∧,∨,¬, 0U , 1U ) is a
Sugeno measure µ∗ : U → [0, 1] (i.e. it satisfies µ∗(0U ) = 0, µ∗(1U ) = 1 and
µ∗(u1) ≤ µ∗(u2) whenever u1 ≤ u2) such that the following ∨-decomposition
property
µ∗(u1 ∨ u2) = max(µ∗(u1), µ∗(u2))
IThis is a fully revised and extended version of the conference paper [10].
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holds. A necessity measure is a Sugeno measure µ∗ satisfying the ∧-
decomposition property
µ∗(u1 ∧ u2) = min(µ∗(u1), µ∗(u2)).
Possibility and necessity are dual classes of measures, in the sense that if µ∗
is a possibility measure, then the function µ∗(u) = 1 − µ∗(¬u) is a necessity
measure, and vice versa. If U is the power set of a set X, then any dual pair of
measures (µ∗, µ∗) on U is induced by a normalized possibility distribution, i.e. a
mapping pi : X → [0, 1] such that, supx∈X pi(x) = 1, and, for any A ⊆ X,
µ∗(A) = sup{pi(x) | x ∈ A} and µ∗(A) = inf{1− pi(x) | x 6∈ A}.1
A usual approach in artificial intelligence is to integrate uncertainty models
within logic-based knowledge representation formalisms by attaching some belief
quantification to declarative statements. In this line, Possibilistic logic is a
weighted logic that handles possibilistic uncertainty by associating certainty, or
priority levels, to classical logic formulas [14]. Possibilistic logic (propositional)
formulas are pairs (ϕ, r), where ϕ is a classical propositional formula and r ∈
(0, 1] is interpreted as a lower bound for the necessity of ϕ. The semantics
is given by possibility distributions on the set Ω of classical interpretations.
Namely, if pi : Ω→ [0, 1], then pi satisfies a pair (ϕ, r), written pi |= (ϕ, r) when
Npi(ϕ) = inf{1−pi(w) | w ∈ Ω, w(ϕ) = 0} ≥ r. Possibilistic logic is axiomatized
by taking as axioms the axioms of Classical Propositional Calculus (CPC) with
weight 1 and as inference rules:
- from (ϕ, α) and (ϕ→ ψ, β) infer (ψ,min(α, β)) (weighted modus ponens);
- from (ϕ, α) infer (ϕ, β), with β ≤ α (weight weakening).
Since its introduction in the mid-eighties, multiple facets of possibilistic logic
have been developed and used for a number of applications in AI, like handling
exceptions in default reasoning, modeling belief revision, providing a graphical
Bayesian-like network representation counterpart to a Possibilistic logic knowl-
edge base or representing positive and negative information in a bipolar setting
with applications to preferences fusion and to version space learning. Moreover,
Possibilistic logic copes with inconsistency by taking advantage of the stratifi-
cation of the set of formulas induced by the associated levels. It is also useful
for representing preferences expressed as sets of prioritized goals, in this case,
the weight is to be understood as the priority level of a goal. Several extensions
of Possibilistic logic deal with time, multiple agents’ mutual beliefs, a symbolic
treatment of priorities for handling partial orders between levels, or learning
stratified hypotheses for coping with exceptions. The reader is referred to [14]
for an extensive overview on Possibilistic logic and its main applications.
1Indeed, µ∗(A) = inf{1− pi(x) | x 6∈ A} holds true only when A 6= X, when A = X then it
must be µ∗(A) = 1.
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When we go beyond the classical framework of Boolean algebras of events
to more general frameworks, appropriate extensions of uncertainty measures
need to be considered in order to represent and reason about the uncertainty
of non-classical or fuzzy events. For instance, the notion of (finitely additive)
probability has been generalized in the setting of MV-algebras by means of the
notion of state [29]2 and has been used in [18] to provide a logical framework
for reasoning about the probability of (finitely-valued) fuzzy events.
Within the posibilistic framework, several extensions of the notions of possi-
bility and necessity measures for fuzzy sets have been proposed in different logi-
cal systems extending the well-known Dubois-Lang-Prade’s Possibilistic logic to
fuzzy events, see e.g. [12, 15, 23, 3, 2, 4]. Actually, the different generalizations
proposed in the literature arise from two observations. First of all, in contra-
position to the classical case, [0, 1]-valued mappings on the set of fuzzy sets in
some (finite) domain X, Π, N : [0, 1]X → [0, 1] satisfying the usual boundary
conditions Π(∅) = N(∅) = 0 and Π(X) = N(X) = 1 and the characteristic
decomposition properties
Π(A ∨B) = max(Π(A),Π(B)), N(A ∧B) = min(N(A), N(B)),
for any A,B ∈ [0, 1]X where ∨ and ∧ denote the pointwise maximum and min-
imum operations, are not univocally determined by a possibility distribution pi
on the set X. The second observation is that in the classical case the expres-
sions of possibility and necessity measures on subsets of a set X in terms of a
possibility distribution on X can be equivalently rewritten as
Π(A) = sup
x∈X
min(pi(x), A(x)), N(A) = inf
x∈X
max(1− pi(x), A(x))
where the subset A ⊆ X is identified with its membership function A : X →
{0, 1}. Therefore, natural generalizations of these expressions when A : X →
[0, 1] is a fuzzy subset of X are
Π(A) = sup
x∈X
pi(x)⊗A(x), N(A) = inf
x∈X
pi(x)⇒ A(x) (*)
where ⊗ is a t-norm and ⇒ is some suitable fuzzy implication function3.
In particular, the following implication functions have been discussed in the
literature as instantiations of the ⇒ operation in (*):
(1) u⇒KD v = max(1− u, v) (Kleene-Dienes implication);
(2) u⇒RG v =
{
1, if u ≤ v
1− u, otherwise (reciprocal of Go¨del implication);
2Another generalization of the notion of probability has been recently studied in depth in
[1] by defining probabilistic states over Go¨del algebras.
3The minimum properties required to a binary operation ⇒: [0, 1] × [0, 1] → [0, 1] to be
considered as fuzzy counterpart of the classical {0, 1}-valued implication truth-function are:
1 ⇒ 1 = 0 ⇒ 0 = 1, 1 ⇒ 0 = 0, ⇒ is non-increasing in the first variable and non-decreasing
in the second variable.
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(3) u⇒ L v = min(1, 1− u+ v) ( Lukasiewicz implication).
All these functions actually lead to proper extensions of the above definition of
necessity over classical sets or events in the sense that if A is a crisp set, i.e.
A(x) ∈ {0, 1} for all x ∈ X, then (*) gives N(A) = infx∈X{max(1−pi(x), A(x))}.
In the literature different logical formalizations to reason about such exten-
sions of the necessity of fuzzy events can be found. In [27], and later in [24], a
full many-valued modal approach is developed over finitely-valued  Lukasiewicz
logics in order to capture the notion of necessity defined using ⇒KD. A logic
programming approach over Go¨del logic is investigated in [3] and in [2] by re-
lying on ⇒KD and ⇒RG, respectively. More recently, following the approach
of [18], modal-like logics to reason about the necessity of fuzzy events in the
framework of MV-algebras have been defined in [19], in order to capture the
notion of necessity defined by ⇒KD and ⇒ L.
The purpose of this paper is to explore different logical approaches to reason
about the necessity of fuzzy events over Go¨del fuzzy logic. In more concrete
terms, our aim is to study a modal-like expansion of the [0, 1]-valued Go¨del logic
with a modality N such that the truth-value of a formula Nϕ (in [0, 1]) can be
interpreted as the degree of necessity of ϕ. In this context, although it does not
extend the classical possibilistic logic, it seems also interesting to investigate the
notion of necessity definable from Go¨del implication, which corresponds to the
standard fuzzy interpretation of the implication connective in Go¨del logic:
(4) u⇒G v =
{
1, if u ≤ v
v, otherwise
(Go¨del implication).
This work is structured as follows. After this introduction and recalling some
background on Go¨del fuzzy logic and related concepts, in Section 3 we recall a
characterization of necessity measures on fuzzy sets defined by the implications
⇒KD and ⇒RG and provide a (new) characterization of those defined by ⇒G.
These characterizations are the basis for the completeness results of several log-
ics introduced in Sections 4, 5 and 6 capturing the corresponding notions of
necessity for Go¨del logic formulas. These logics, with Kripke style semantics,
are built over a two-level language composed of modal and non-modal formulas,
the former not allowing nested applications of the modal operator. A common
fragment of these logics akin to classical possibilistic logic is considered in Sec-
tion 8. Some remarks about the computational complexity for these logics are
made in Section 9. Finally, in Section 10, we mention some open problems and
new research goals we plan to address in the near future.
2. Preliminaries on the Go¨del fuzzy logic G and its expansions G∆(C)
All this section is devoted to preliminaries on the Go¨del fuzzy logic G and its
expansions G∆(C). We present their syntax and semantics, their main logical
properties and the notation we use throughout the article.
The language of Go¨del propositional logic is built as usual from a countable
set of propositional variables V , the constant 0 and the binary connectives ∧
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and →. Disjunction and negation are respectively defined as ϕ ∨ ψ := ((ϕ →
ψ)→ ψ) ∧ ((ψ → ϕ)→ ϕ) and as ¬ϕ := ϕ→ 0, and the constant 1 is taken as
0→ 0.
As a many-valued logic, Go¨del logic is the axiomatic extension of Ha´jek’s
Basic Fuzzy Logic BL [24] (which is the logic of continuous t-norms and their
residua) by means of the contraction axiom ϕ → (ϕ ∧ ϕ). Since the unique
idempotent continuous t-norm is the minimum, this yields that Go¨del logic is
strongly complete with respect to its standard fuzzy semantics that interprets
formulas over the structure [0, 1]G = ([0, 1],min,⇒G, 0, 1)4, i.e. semantics de-
fined by truth-evaluations e such that e(ϕ ∧ ψ) = min(e(ϕ), e(ψ)), e(ϕ→ ψ) =
e(ϕ)⇒G e(ψ) and e(0) = 0. As a consequence e(ϕ ∨ ψ) = max(e(ϕ), e(ψ)) and
e(¬ϕ) = ¬Ge(ϕ) = e(ϕ)⇒G 0.
Go¨del logic can also be seen as the axiomatic extension of intuitionistic
propositional logic by the prelinearity axiom (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ). Its algebraic
semantics is therefore given by the variety of prelinear Heyting algebras, also
known as Go¨del algebras. A Go¨del algebra is a structure A = (A, ∗,⇒, 0, 1)
which is a (bounded, integral, commutative) residuated lattice satisfying the
contraction equation
x ∗ x = x
and pre-linearity equation
(x⇒ y) ∨ (y ⇒ x) = 1,
where x ∨ y = ((x ⇒ y) ⇒ y) ∗ ((y ⇒ x) ⇒ x)). Go¨del algebras are locally
finite, i.e. given a Go¨del algebra A and a finite set F of elements of A, the
Go¨del subalgebra generated by F is finite as well.
On the other hand, Ha´jek also shows [24] that Go¨del logic can be expanded
with the so-called Monteiro-Baaz’s projection connective ∆. Truth-evaluations
of Go¨del logic are extended adding the stipulation e(∆ϕ) = δ(e(ϕ)) where
δ(x) =
{
1, if x = 1
0, otherwise
Axioms and rules for G∆ are those of Go¨del logic plus the following axioms
(∆1) ∆ϕ ∨ ¬∆ϕ (∆2) ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (∆ϕ ∨∆ψ)
(∆3) ∆ϕ→ ϕ (∆4) ∆ϕ→ ∆∆ϕ
(∆5) ∆(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∆ϕ→ ∆ψ)
and the Necessitation rule for ∆: from ϕ derive ∆ϕ. G∆ is shown to be stan-
dard complete (i.e. wrt. the structure [0, 1]G∆ = ([0, 1],min,⇒G, δ, 0, 1)) for
deductions from finite theories.
It is worth noticing that Go¨del logic satisfies the classical deduction theorem,
Γ ∪ {ϕ} `G ψ iff Γ `G ϕ → ψ, while the deduction theorem for G∆ reads as
follows: Γ ∪ {ϕ} `G∆ ψ iff Γ `G∆ ∆ϕ→ ψ.
4Called standard Go¨del algebra.
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Finally, the logic G∆ can be expanded with truth-constants r for each r be-
longing to a countable C ⊆ [0, 1], containing 0 and 1 (in particular one may take
C = [0, 1]∩Q, the set of rational numbers in the unit real interval). Additional
axioms of G∆(C) [17] are book-keeping axioms for the different connectives of the
logics: namely, for any r, s ∈ C, the axioms r ∧ s↔ min(r, s), r → s↔ r ⇒G s,
and the axioms ∆r ↔ δ(r). So defined, the logic G∆(C) can be shown to satisfy
the same deduction theorem as G∆ and to be standard complete for deductions
from finite theories wrt. the standard structure [0, 1]G∆ expanded with truth
constants r interpreted by their own value5 r, for each r ∈ C. In case of ex-
panding G∆ with a finite set of truth-constants C, Ha´jek already proved that
the resulting logic G∆(C) is strongly standard complete [24, Th. 4.2.21].
As a last remark, let us notice that the algebraic semantics for G∆(C) is
given by the varieties of G∆(C)-algebras, which are expansions of Go¨del algebras
defined in the natural way, and are also locally finite.
3. Some representable classes of necessity measures over Go¨del alge-
bras of fuzzy sets and their characterizations
Let (L,≤, 0, 1) be a bounded linearly ordered set. Let X be a finite set and
let F (X) = LX be the set of functions f : X → L, in other words, the set of L-
fuzzy sets over X. F (X) can be regarded as a Go¨del algebra equipped with the
pointwise extension of the operations of the linearly ordered Go¨del algebra over
L. In the following, for each r ∈ L, we will denote by r the constant function
r(x) = r for all x ∈ X.
In this section we provide characterizations of some classes of necessity mea-
sures on Go¨del algebras of functions of F (X) which are representable in terms
of possibility distributions pi : X → L and implication functions considered in
the Introduction. But we first introduce a general notion of basic necessity over
particular subsets of F (X) that encompasses all those representable classes, just
by requiring to satisfy the corresponding extensions of the two defining proper-
ties in the Boolean case. For the sake of a simpler notation we denote by F (X)
both the set of L-fuzzy sets over X and the Go¨del algebra of functions which
has as domain this set.
Definition 1. Let L be a bounded linearly ordered set and let U ⊆ F (X) be
closed under ∧ and such that 0, 1 ∈ U . A mapping N : U → L satisfying
(N1) N(f ∧ g) = min(N(f), N(g))
(N2) N(r) = r, for all r ∈ L such that r ∈ U
is called a basic necessity.
If U ⊆ F (X) is a Go¨del subalgebra and N : U → L is a basic necessity then
it is easy to check that N also satisfies the following properties:
5If ∆ was not present in the logic, we would still have completeness but w.r.t. to algebras
over [0, 1] with truth-constants not necessarily interpreted by their own values.
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(i) min(N(f), N(¬Gf)) = 0
(ii) N(f ⇒G g) ≤ N(f)⇒G N(g)
where ¬Gf = f ⇒G 0. The classes of necessity measures based on the Kleene-
Dienes implication and the reciprocal of Go¨del implication have been already
characterized in [3, 2], but we provide the proof below to keep the paper self-
contained. We do not consider here the one based on  Lukasiewicz implication,
which was addressed in [19]. Notice that, for these characterizations to work
one has to consider necessities over the full set of functions F (X).
For each x ∈ X, let us denote by x its characteristic function, i.e. the
function in F (X) such that x(y) = 1, if y = x and x(y) = 0, otherwise. Observe
that each f ∈ F (X) can be written as
f =
∧
x∈X
x⇒ f(x),
where ⇒ is an implication function (as the ones introduced in Section 1) such
that 1⇒ u = u for any u ∈ L. Therefore, if N is a basic necessity on F (X), by
(N1) we have
N(f) = inf
x∈X
N(x⇒ f(x)).
Using this then we have the following characterizations.
Proposition 2 (cf [3, 2]). Let N : F (X)→ L be a basic necessity over F (X),
where {0, 1} ⊆ L ⊆ [0, 1] is closed by the standard negation n(x) = 1− x. Then
we have:
(i) N satisfies the following property for all f ∈ F (X) and r ∈ L:
(NKD) N(r ⇒KD f) = r ⇒KD N(f)
if and only if there exists a normalized possibility distribution pi : X → L
such that, for all f ∈ F (X), N(f) = infx∈X(pi(x)⇒KD f(x));
(ii) N satisfies the following property for all f ∈ F (X) and r ∈ L:
(NRG) N(r ⇒KD f) = r ⇒G N(f)
if and only if there exists a normalized possibility distribution pi : X → L
such that, for all f ∈ F (X), N(f) = infx∈X(pi(x)⇒RG f(x)).
Proof: (i) Assume N is defined as N(f) = infx∈X(pi(x) ⇒KD f(x)). Then,
since 1− r = 1 − r, N(r ⇒KD f) = infx∈X((1 − pi(x)) ∨ ((1 − r) ∨ f(x)) =
(1− r) ∨ infx∈X((1− pi(x)) ∨ f(x)) = r ⇒KD N(f). As for the other direction,
assume N satifies (NKD). From the above remarks, for each f ∈ F (X) we have
N(f) = infx∈X N(x ⇒KD f(x)) = infx∈X N(1− f(x) ⇒KD (1 − x)). Now,
defining pi(x) = 1 −N(1 − x) and applying (NKD), we get N(f) = infx∈X(1 −
f(x))⇒KD (1− pi(x)) = infx∈X pi(x)⇒KD f(x).
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(ii) Assume N is defined as N(f) = infx∈X(pi(x) ⇒RG f(x)). We use the
fact that, for any u, v, t ∈ [0, 1], it is easy to check that the identity u ⇒RG
(v ∨ t) = (1− t)⇒G (u⇒RG v) holds. Then, again since 1− r = 1− r, we have
N(r ⇒KD f) = infx∈X(pi(x)⇒RG (r ⇒KD f)(x)) = infx∈X(pi(x)⇒RG (1− r ∨
f(x))) = r ⇒G (infx∈X pi(x) ⇒RG f(x)) = r ⇒G N(f). Conversely, assume N
satisfies (NRG). Then, reasoning as above and defining pi(x) = 1 − N(1 − x),
we have N(f) = infx∈X N(x⇒KD f(x)) = infx∈X N(1− f(x)⇒KD (1− x)) =
infx∈X(1− f(x))⇒G N(1− x) = infx∈X pi(x)⇒RG f(x). 2
The characterization of the necessity measures based on the Go¨del implica-
tion function is a bit more involved since it requires the presence of an associated
class of possibility measures which are not dual in the usual strong sense.
Definition 3. Let U ⊆ F (X) be a Go¨del subalgebra. A mapping Π : U → L
satisfying
(Π1) Π(f ∨ g) = max(Π(f),Π(g))
(Π2) Π(r) = r, for all r ∈ L such that r ∈ U
is called a basic possibility.
Note that if Π : U ⊆ F (X) → L is a basic possibility then it also satisfies
max(Π(¬Gf),Π(¬G¬Gf)) = 1. Now observe that each f ∈ F (X) can be written
as
f =
∨
x∈X
x ∧ f(x).
and hence, since at the beginning of this section we have assumed that X is
finite, if Π is a basic possibility on F (X), by (Π1) we have
Π(f) = sup
x∈X
Π(x ∧ f(x)).
Proposition 4. Let Π : F (X)→ L be a basic possibility over F (X). Π further
satisfies
(Π3) Π(f ∧ r) = min(Π(f), r), for all r ∈ L
iff there exists a normalized pi : X → L and, for all f ∈ F (X), Π(f) =
supx∈X min(pi(x), f(x)).
Proof: One direction is easy. Conversely, assume that Π : F (X) → L satisfies
(Π1) and (Π3). Then, taking into account the above observations, we have
Π(f) = sup
x∈X
Π(x ∧ f(x)) = sup
x∈X
min(Π(x), f(x)).
Hence, the claim easily follows by defining pi(x) = Π(x) . 2
Proposition 5. Let N : F (X)→ L be a basic necessity and Π : F (X)→ L be
a basic possibility satisfying (Π3). N and Π further satisfy
8
(NΠ) N(f ⇒G r) = Π(f)⇒G r, for all r ∈ L
iff there exists a normalized pi : X → L and, for all f ∈ F (X),
N(f) = inf
x∈X
pi(x)⇒G f(x) and Π(f) = sup
x∈X
min(pi(x), f(x)).
Proof: Given a possibility distribution pi on X, define N(f) = infx∈X pi(x)⇒G
f(x) and Π(f) = supx∈X min(pi(x), f(x)), for each f ∈ F (X). It is clear that so
defined N and Π are a basic necessity and a basic possibility respectively. But
we also have N(f ⇒G r) = infx∈X(pi(x) ⇒G (f(x) ⇒G r)) = infx∈X((pi(x) ∧
f(x)) ⇒G r) = (supx∈X pi(x) ∧ f(x)) ⇒G r = Π(f) ⇒G r. Hence, Π and N
satisfy (NΠ).
Conversely, suppose that N and Π are a basic necessity and possibility
satisfying (NΠ). Then, defining pi : X → L by pi(x) = Π(x) for each
x ∈ X, we have N(f) = infx∈X N(x ⇒G f(x)) = infx∈X Π(x) ⇒G f(x) =
infx∈X pi(x) ⇒G f(x). Moreover, if Π also satisfies (Π3), by Proposition 4, we
have Π(f) = supx∈X min(pi(x), f(x)).
2
4. The Logic of Basic Necessity NG0(C)
In this and the following three sections we define several logics to capture
reasoning about the necessity of fuzzy events, understood as equivalence classes
of formulas of Go¨del logic with a finite set of truth constants C. Following
previous approaches like [24], the idea is to introduce a modal operator N such
that, for every formula ϕ of the logic G∆(C), Nϕ is fuzzy proposition which
reads “ϕ is certain” whose truth-value is to be interpreted as the necessity
degree of ϕ. The logics we will define next are built over a two-level language:
non-modal formulas to describe and reason about the events and modal formulas
(without nesting of the operators N) to represent and reason about the certainty
or necessity of the non-modal formulas. Since possibilistic models are basically
qualitative models of uncertainty (the comparative ordering is what matters
rather than absolute degrees), we choose again Go¨del logic (with a finite set of
truth-constants) as fuzzy logic to reason about the modal Nϕ formulas. Due to
the semantics of the logic G∆(C) one can express that the necessity of ϕ is at
least r or at most s (with r, s ∈ C) by the formulas r → Nϕ and Nϕ→ s, while
a formula Nϕ → Nψ expresses the qualitative comparative statement “ψ is at
least as certain as ϕ”.
The particular semantics of the necessity operators N will vary from one
section to the other. In this section we axiomatize the operators N whose
semantics is given by the class of basic necessity measures, while in the follow-
ing sections we will successively consider the logics for the operators N whose
semantics are given by the three classes of representable measures studied in
Section 3. As shown there, the basic differences between all these logics will
be the way N handle truth-constants, this is a main reason to include a set C
of truth-constants in the languages of both modal and non-modal formulas of
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our logics. A second reason is to be able to express statements of the kind “the
necessity of ϕ is at least r”, as explained above.
4.1. Syntax of NG0(C)
Let us fix a set of propositional variables V and a countable set C ⊆ [0, 1]∩Q
containing 0 and 1.
The language of NG0(C) consists of two classes of formulas:
(i) the set Fm(V,C) of non-modal formulas ϕ,ψ . . ., which are formulas of
G∆(C) (Go¨del logic G expanded with the Monteiro-Baaz’s projection con-
nective ∆ and truth constants r for each rational r ∈ C ⊂ [0, 1]) built from
the set of propositional variables V = {p1, p2, . . .};
(ii) and the set MFm(V,C) of modal formulas Φ,Ψ . . ., built from atomic
modal formulas Nϕ, with ϕ ∈ Fm(V,C), where N denotes the modality
necessity, using the connectives from G∆ and truth constants r for each
rational r ∈ C ⊂ [0, 1]. Notice that nested modalities are not allowed. By
“modal theory” we will simply mean a set of modal formulas.
The axioms of the logic NG0(C) of basic necessity are the axioms of G∆(C)
for non-modal and modal formulas plus the following necessity related modal
axioms:
(N1) N(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Nϕ→ Nψ)
(N2) N(r)↔ r, for each r ∈ C ⊆ [0, 1] ∩Q.
The rules of inference of NG0(C) are modus ponens (for modal and non-modal
formulas) and necessitation for non-modal formulas: if ϕ is a theorem of G∆(C)
then Nϕ is a theorem of NG0(C). These axioms and rules define a notion of
proof, denoted `NG0(C), in the usual way. It is worth noting that NG0(C) proves
the formula N(ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ (Nϕ ∧ Nψ), which encodes a characteristic property
of necessity measures.
In the particular case of no additional truth-constants in the language other
than 1 and 0, i.e. when C = {0, 1}, there is no need to consider the expansion
with the ∆ operator, and hence one should consider the logic G instead of the
logic G∆(C).
4.2. Semantics of NG0(C)
For the semantics of NG0(C) we consider several classes of possibilistic Kripke
models.
A C-basic necessity Kripke model is a system M = 〈W, e, I〉 where:
• W is a non-empty set whose elements are called nodes or worlds,
• e : W × V → [0, 1] is such that, for each w ∈ W , e(w, ·) : V → [0, 1] is
an evaluation of propositional variables which is extended to a G∆(C)-
evaluation of non-modal formulas of Fm(V,C) in the usual way.
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• For each ϕ ∈ Fm(V,C) we define its associated function ϕˆ : W → [0, 1],
where ϕˆ(w) = e(w,ϕ). Let ̂Fm(V,C) = {ϕˆ | ϕ ∈ Fm(V,C)}
• I : ̂Fm(V,C)→ [0, 1] is a basic necessity over ̂Fm(V,C) (as a G-algebra),
i.e. it satisfies
(i) I(rˆ) = r, for all r ∈ C ⊆ [0, 1] ∩Q
(ii) I(ϕˆ1 ∧ ϕˆ2) = min(I(ϕˆ1), I(ϕˆ2)).
Now, given a modal formula Φ, the truth value of Φ in M = 〈W, e, I〉,
denoted ‖Φ‖M, is inductively defined as follows:
• If Φ is an atomic modal formula Nϕ, then ‖Nϕ‖M = I(ϕˆ)
• If Φ is a non-atomic modal formula, then its truth value is computed by
evaluating its atomic modal subformulas, and then by using the truth
functions associated to the G∆(C)-connectives occurring in Φ.
We will denote by N (C) the class of C-basic necessity Kripke models.
4.3. Completeness of NG0(C)
Taking into account that G∆(C)-algebras are locally finite, following the
same approach of [19] with the necessary modifications, one can prove the fol-
lowing result.
Theorem 6. Let C ⊆ [0, 1] ∩ Q be finite. NG0(C) is sound and complete for
modal theories wrt. the class N (C) of C-basic necessity Kripke models.
Proof: Let Γ and Φ be a modal theory and a modal formula respectively, and
asssume Γ 6`NG0(C) Φ. We will prove that there exists a basic necessity Kripke
model M satisfying Γ but not Φ. We follow the strategy adopted in [24, 18]
that amounts to translating theories over NG0(C) into theories over G∆(C). For
each modal formula Ψ, let us denote by Ψ? the corresponding G∆(C)-formula
obtained from Ψ by considering any atomic subformula of the form Nϕ as a
new propositional variable. Define, therefore, Γ? = {Ψ? | Ψ ∈ Γ} and
Ax? = {Υ? | Υ is an instance of axiom (Ni), i = 1, 2} ∪ {(Nϕ)? | `G∆(C) ϕ}.
Using the same technique used in [24] it is not difficult to prove that
Γ 6`NG0(C) Φ iff Γ? ∪Ax? 6`G∆(C) Φ?. (1)
Now, since G∆(C) is strongly complete for C finite [24, Theorem 4.2.21], we know
that there exists a G∆(C)-evaluation v that is a model of Γ
? ∪ Ax? such that
v(Φ?) < 1. We define then the following Kripke model: M = (W, e, I), where
W is the set of G-evaluations of propositional variables V , e : W × V → [0, 1]
defined by
• e(w, pi) = w(pi), for all w ∈W and pi ∈ V ,
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and extended to G∆(C)-formulas as usual, and I : ̂Fm(V,C)→ [0, 1] defined by
• I(ϕˆ) = v((Nϕ)?) .
It is fairly easy to see that M is indeed a Kripke model equipped with a basic
necessity I, since:
(i) I(ϕˆ ∧ ψˆ) = I(ϕ̂ ∧ ψ) = v((N(ϕ ∧ ψ))?) = v((Nϕ)? ∧ (Nψ)?) =
min(v((Nϕ)?), v((Nψ)?)) = min(I(ϕˆ), I(ψˆ)).
(ii) I(rˆ) = v((Nr)?) = v(r) = r, for each r ∈ C.
Notice that the only constant functions in ̂Fm(V,C) are those of the form rˆ
for r ∈ C. And that while M is a model for Γ, it holds that ||Φ||M < 1. 2
Actually, when the set of propositional variables V is assumed to be finite,
by suitably modifying the above proof one can prove that NG0(C) is not only
complete wrt. the class N (C) of basic necessity Kripke models but also wrt. the
subclass of finite structures (and hence also wrt. the subclass of rational-valued
structures).
Corollary 7. Let V and C be finite. Then NG0(C) is complete for finite modal
theories wrt. the class of finite C-basic necessity Kripke models.
Proof: Assume Γ 6`NG0 Φ, with Γ finite, and proceed as above until there exists
a G∆(C)-evaluation v that is a model of Γ
? ∪ Ax? such that v(Φ?) < 1. Since
the variety of Go¨del algebras is locally finite, the set of equivalence classes of
formulas of Fm(V,C) modulo provable equivalence is finite as well. Hence we
may assume that Ax? is finite as well. Moreover, since the set of tautologies
of G is the intersection of the tautologies of the n-valued Go¨del logics Gn, the
above implies that there exists a sufficiently large n ∈ N such that Φ? does not
follow from Γ? ∪ Ax? over Gn,∆(C), the finitely-valued Go¨del logic Gn, with
truth values Cn = {0, 1/n, . . . , 1}, expanded with ∆ and truth constants from
C ⊆ Cn. Therefore, we have that Γ? ∪ Ax? 6|=Gn,∆(C) Φ?, i.e. there exists a
Cn-valued Go¨del assignment v
′ such that v′(Ψ?) = 1 for all Ψ? ∈ Γ? ∪Ax? and
v′(Φ?) < 1.
We define the following Kripke model: M = (Wn, e, I), where Wn is the
finite set of Gn-evaluations of propositional variables V, e : Wn × V → Cn
defined by
• e(w, p) = w(p), for all w ∈Wn and p ∈ V
and extended to Gn,∆(Cn) formulas as usual using Gn,∆(C) logic connectives,
and I : ̂Fm(V,C)→ Cn is defined by
• I(ϕˆ) = v′((Nϕ)?).
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In particular, since v′ is a model of the translation of the (N2) axiom, for each
r ∈ C we have I(rˆ) = v′((Nr)?) = v′(r) = r, for each r ∈ C. It is easy to check
that, so defined, I is a basic necessity, and hence M is indeed a finite basic
necessity Kripke model. Notice also that I(ϕˆ) = v′((Nϕ)?) if ϕ ∈ Fm(V,C).
Finally, one can check that M is a model for Γ and that ||Φ||M < 1. 2
Let us say that a modal formula Φ is 1-satisfiable if there exists a necessity
Kripke structure M = 〈W, e, I〉 such that ‖Φ‖M = 1. As a corollary of the
model construction in the above proof, we have the following result.
Corollary 8. Let Φ be a modal formula of MFm(V,C) with V and C finite.
If Φ is 1-satisfiable then it is satisfiable in a finite model, that is, there exists
M = 〈W, e, I〉 with W being finite such that ‖Φ‖M = 1.
Proof: The condition of Φ being 1-satisfiable is equivalent to the condition that
¬∆Φ is not a valid formula in the the class N (C) of basic necessity Kripke
models, and then, following the proof of the completeness result in Corollary 7,
one can build a finite model M where ‖¬∆Φ‖M < 1, i.e. where ‖Φ‖M = 1. 2
In next sections we consider extensions of NG0(C) which faithfully capture
the three different notions of necessity measures introduced before.
5. The Kleene-Dienes implication-based necessity logic NGKD(C)
In this section we assume C to be closed by the standard negation, i.e. if
r ∈ C, then 1− r ∈ C as well. We start by considering the following additional
axiom:
(NKD) N(r ∨ ϕ)↔ (r ∨Nϕ), for each r ∈ C
Let NGKD(C) be the axiomatic extension of NG
0(C) with the axiom (NKD).
The aim is to show completeness of NGKD(C) with respect to the subclass
NKD(C) of N (C) structures M = (W, e, I) such that for every ϕ ∈ Fm(V,C),
I(ϕˆ) = infw∈W pi(w)⇒KD ϕˆ(w) for some possibility distribution pi : W → [0, 1]
on the set of possible worlds W .
Lemma 9. Let C ⊆ C′. Then NGKD(C′) is a conservative extension of
NGKD(C).
Proof: Let Γ and Φ be a modal theory and a modal formula respectively in the
language of NGKD(C), i.e. Γ ∪ {Φ} ⊆ MFm(V,C), such that Γ |=NGKD(C′) Φ.
Reasoning as in Theorem 6, Γ `NGKD(C′) Φ iff Γ?∪Ax? `G∆(C′) Φ?, where Ax is
the set of instances of the axioms using only constants from C. Now, the lemma
follows using the fact that G∆(C
′) is a conservative extension of G∆(C). 2
Theorem 10. Let Γ ∪ {Φ} be a subset of MFm(V,C). Then:
(i) If Γ `NGKD(C) Φ then Γ |=NGKD(C) Φ;
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(ii) Let V and C be finite. There exists a sufficiently large finite C′ ⊇ C such
that, if Γ 6`NGKD(C′) Φ, then Γ 6|=NGKD(C′) Φ.
Proof: Assume Γ 6`NGKD(C) Φ for some finite theory Γ. Notice that, due to
Lemma 9, this means Γ 6`NGKD(C′) Φ for each C′ ⊇ C. The proof begins exactly
as the proof of Corollary 7 for NG0(C). Let n ∈ N be the natural number found
there such that Φ? does not follow from Γ?∪Ax? over Gn,∆(C). If Cn ⊆ C then
there exists n′ ≥ n such that Cn′ = C, and we take C′ = Cn′ = C. Otherwise,
if Cn ⊃ C then take n′ = n and C′ = Cn. Let v be a Gn′,∆(C′)-evaluation such
that v(Ψ∗) = 1 for each Ψ ∈ Γ? ∪Ax?, and v(Φ∗) < 1.
Now consider the model M = (W, e, I) where W is the finite set of C′-
valued evaluations of propositional variables of V , e : W × V → C′ is defined
as e(w, p) = w(p) and e(w, ·) is extended to Gn′,∆(C′)-evaluations to formulas
of Fm(V,C′) as usual. Finally, the necessity I : ̂Fm(V,C′) → C′ is defined as
I(ϕˆ) = v((Nϕ)?). Notice that now ̂Fm(V,C′) is the set of all functions CW ,
including all constant functions r for each r ∈ C′. But, since v is a model of
Ax? containing all necessary instances of the translation of (NKD), I is easily
seen to satisfy also I((1− r ∨ ϕ)̂ ) = I(1− r ∨ ϕˆ) = max(1− r, I(ϕˆ)), for every
r ∈ C′. Therefore, by (i) of Lemma 2, there exists pi : W → C′ such that
I(ϕˆ) = minw∈W max(1 − pi(w), w(ϕ)). Hence M = (W, e, I) ∈ NGKD(C) is a
model such that ‖Ψ‖M = 1 for each Ψ ∈ Γ and ‖Φ‖M < 1. 2
6. The reciprocal of Go¨del implication-based necessity logic
NGRG(C)
To capture RG-necessities, let us assume that C is closed under the standard
negation, i.e. if r ∈ C, then 1 − r ∈ C as well. We define NGRG(C) as the
axiomatic extension of NG0(G) over G∆(C) with the following axiom:
(NRG) N(ϕ ∨ r)↔ (1− r → Nϕ), for each r ∈ C
and define NRG(C) as the subclass of N (C) structures M = (W, e, I) such that
for every ϕ ∈ Fm(V,C), I(ϕˆ) = infw∈W pi(w) ⇒RG ϕˆ(w) for some possibility
distribution pi : W → [0, 1] on the set of possible worlds W .
Then, using again Lemma 2 and an analog of Lemma 9 for NGRG(C), one
can prove the following result arguing as in the proof of Theorem 10.
Theorem 11. Let Γ ∪ {Φ} be a subset of MFm(V,C). Then:
(i) If Γ `NGRG(C) Φ then Γ |=NGRG(C) Φ;
(ii) Let V and C be finite. There exists a sufficiently large finite C′ ⊇ C
closed by the standard negation such that, if Γ 6`NGRG(C′) Φ, then Γ 6|=NGRG(C′)
Φ.
It is worth pointing out that if we add the Boolean axiom ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ to the
logics NKD(C) and NRG(C), both extensions would basically collapse into the
classical possibilistic logic.
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7. The Go¨del implication-based necessity logic NΠG(C)
Finally, to define a logic capturing NG-necessities, we need to expand the
language of NG0(C) with an additional operator Π to capture the associated
possibility measures according to Proposition 5. Therefore we consider the
extended set MFm(V,C)+ of modal formulas Φ,Ψ . . . as those built from atomic
modal formulas Nϕ and Πϕ, with ϕ ∈ Fm(V,C), truth-constants r for each
r ∈ C ⊆ [0, 1]∩Q and G∆ connectives. Then the axioms of the logic NΠG(C) are
those of G∆(C) for non-modal and modal formulas, plus the following necessity
related modal axioms:
(N1) N(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Nϕ→ Nψ)
(N2) N(r)↔ r,
(Π1) Π(ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ (Πϕ ∨Πψ)
(Π2) Π(r)↔ r,
(Π3) Π(ϕ ∧ r)↔ (Πϕ ∧ r)
(NΠ) N(ϕ→ r)↔ (Πϕ→ r)
where (N2), (Π2), (Π3) and (NΠ) hold for each r ∈ C. Inference rules of NΠG(C)
are those of G∆(C) and necessitation for N and Π.
Now, we also need to consider expanded Kripke structures of the formM =
〈W, e, I, P 〉, where W and e are as above and the mappings I, P :→ [0, 1] are
such that, for every ϕ ∈ Fm(V,C), I(ϕˆ) = infw∈W pi(w)⇒G ϕˆ(w) and P (ϕˆ) =
supw∈W min(pi(w), ϕˆ(w)), for some possibility distribution pi : W → [0, 1]. Call
NPG(C) the class for such structures. Then, using Proposition 5 we get the
following result.
Theorem 12.
(i) NΠG(C) is sound wrt. the class NPG(C) of structures.
(ii) Let V be finite and let Γ ∪ {Φ} be a finite subset of MFm(V,C). There
exists a sufficiently large finite C′ ⊇ C such that such that if Γ 6`NΠG(C′) Φ then
Γ 6|=NΠG(C′) Φ.
Proof: Assume Γ 6`NΠG(C) Φ. Again, the proof proceeds very similar to the pre-
vious ones, but now the model that is built M = (W, e, I, P ) has been expanded
with a mapping P : ̂Fm(V,C′)→ C′ defined by
• P (ϕˆ) = v((Πϕ)?).
Then, it is easy to check that so defined P is a basic possibility (see Defi-
nition 3). Moreover, since Ax? contains the necessary instances of axioms
(N1), (N2), (Π1), (Π2), (Π3), and (NΠ), the mappings I and P satisfy the
conditions of Proposition 5, and hence there exists pi : W → C′ such that
I(ϕˆ) = minw∈W pi(w)⇒G w(ϕ) and P (ϕˆ) = maxw∈W min(pi(w), w(ϕ)). There-
fore M = (Wn, e, I, P ) is a NPG(C′)-model satisfying all formulas in Γ but
‖Φ‖M < 1. 2
The main features of the four logics defined so far are summarized in Table
1.
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Table 1: Logics capturing different notions of necessity measures.
Logic Axioms Semantics M = (W, e, I) Implication Function
NG0(C) N(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Nϕ→ Nψ) I(rˆ) = r
N(r)↔ r I(ϕˆ ∧ ψˆ) = min(I(ϕˆ), I(ψˆ))
NGKD(C) N(r ∨ ϕ)↔ (r ∨Nϕ), pi : W → [0, 1] Kleene-Dienes
I(ϕˆ) = infw∈W pi(w)⇒KD ϕˆ(w) u⇒KD v = max(1− u, v)
NGRG(C) N(ϕ ∨ r)↔ (1− r → Nϕ), pi : W → [0, 1] Reciprocal of Go¨del
I(ϕˆ) = infw∈W pi(w)⇒RG ϕˆ(w) u⇒RG v =
{
1, if u ≤ v
1− u, other.
NΠG(C) N(ϕ→ r)↔ (Πϕ→ r) M = (W, e, I, P ), pi : W → [0, 1] Go¨del
Π(r)↔ r I(ϕˆ) = infw∈W pi(w)⇒G ϕˆ(w) u⇒G v =
{
1, if u ≤ v
v, other.
Π(ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ (Πϕ ∨ Πψ) P (ϕˆ) = supw∈W min(pi(w), ϕˆ(w))
Π(ϕ ∧ r)↔ (Πϕ ∧ r)
8. A common fragment of NGKD(C), NGRG(C) and NΠG(C)
In this section we turn our attention to a fragment of the previous logics, that
is syntactically very close to classical possibilistic logic, consisting of formulas
of the kind r → Nϕ, where ϕ contains neither additional truth-constants nor
the ∆ operator, and r ∈ C \ {0}. By analogy to classical possibilistic logic, we
will simply write (ϕ, r) for r → Nϕ.
Let PGL be the common fragment of NGKD(C),NGRG(C) and NΠG(C)
over the language of formulas of the kind (ϕ, r) and axiomatized by the
following axioms
- (ϕ, 1), with ϕ being an axiom of Go¨del logic
and the following inference rules:
- from (ϕ, r), (ϕ→ ψ, s) infer (ψ,min(r, s)) (weighted modus ponens)
- from (ϕ, r) infer (ϕ, s), with s ≤ r (weight weakening)
We will denote by `PGL the notion of deduction using the above axioms and
rules. Since axiom (K) and the necessitation rule are present in all the three
logics, PGL is sound with respect to the three classes of Kripke models NKD(C),
NRG(C) and NPG(C). Moreover we can show that deductions in PGL and in
Go¨del logic are very related, mimicking the relationship between deductions in
(classical) possibilistic logic and CPC deductions within stratified propositional
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logic formulas.
In the following, for any set of PGL-formulas T = {(ψ1, r1), . . . (ψm, rm)},
we will denote by T ∗s = {ψ | (ψ, r) ∈ T and r ≥ s} and by T ∗ the whole set
{ψ1, . . . , ψm} of the underlying set of Go¨del logic formulas,
Lemma 13. Let T = {(ψ1, r1), . . . (ψm, rm)}. Then T `PGL (ϕ, s) iff T ∗s `G ϕ.
Proof: Easy by noticing that proofs can be easily transferred from one logic to
the other and that if a formula (ψi, ri) ∈ T is used in the proof of (ϕ, s), because
of the two inference rules, then necessarily s ≥ ri. 2
Lemma 14. Let L ∈ {NGKD(C),NGRG(C),NΠG(C)}, and let T be a finite set
of PGL-formulas. If T |=L (ϕ, r) for some r > 0, then T ∗ |=G ϕ.
Proof: Assume T |=L (ϕ, r) with T ∗ being G-consistent, otherwise the result
trivially holds. Let w be a Go¨del evaluation such that w is a model of T ∗ and
let piw be the possibility distribution such that piw(w) = 1 and piw(w
′) = 0 for
w′ 6= w. Consider then the Kripke model Mw = (W, e, Iw) where W is the set
of G-evaluations for G-formulas, and Iw(ψˆ) = infw′∈W piw(w′) ⇒ w′(ψ), where
⇒∈ {⇒KD,⇒RG,⇒G}.
Let L ∈ {NGKD(C),NΠG(C)}. An easy computation shows that, for any
G∆(C)-formula ψ, ‖Nψ‖Mw = w(ψ) and hence Mw |= (ψ, r) iff w(ψ) ≥ r.
Therefore, Mw is clearly a model of T . Therefore we have proved that for each
G-model w of T ∗, w(ϕ) ≥ r, in other words, T ∗ |=G∆(C) r → ϕ, and using the
deduction theorem for the logic G∆(C), |=G∆(C) r → (∆φT → ϕ), where φT is
the conjunction of all the formulas of the theory T ∗. Now, using results from
[22]6, it holds that |=G∆ ∆φT → ϕ, i.e. T ∗ |=G∆ ϕ, and since T ∗ and ϕ do not
contain the ∆ connective, this is equivalent to T ∗ |=G ϕ.
Let L = NGRG(C). In this case, ‖Nψ‖Mw = 0 if w(ψ) < 1 and ‖Nψ‖Mw = 1
otherwise. Hence Mw |= (ψ, r) with r > 0 iff w(ψ) = 1. Therefore, Mw is
clearly a model of T . Therefore we have proved that for each G-model w of T ∗,
w(ϕ) = 1, in other words, T ∗ |=G ϕ. 2
The next theorem shows partial completeness results for PGL with respect
to the three different representable notions of necessity measures.
Theorem 15. Let L ∈ {NGKD(C),NGRG(C),NΠG(C)}. Let T =
{(ψ1, r1), . . . (ψm, rm)} be a finite set of PGL formulas. Then, if T `PGL (ϕ, r)
then T |=L (ϕ, r). Conversely, if T |=L (ϕ, r) with r > 0, then T `PGL
(ϕ,min(r1, . . . , rm)).
6In [22] the author studies the functions from the unit hypercube [0, 1]n into [0, 1] associated
to formulas of Go¨del logic (with n being the number of variables of the formula) and from
the form of these functions it follows that there is no Go¨del logic formula ϕ such that, given
r ∈ (0, 1], v(ϕ) ≥ r for each valuation v. In particular this means that if, for some truth-
constant r > 0 from C, r → ϕ is a tautology of G∆(C), then necessarily ϕ itself must be a
tautology of Go¨del logic.
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Proof: One direction is soundness. As for the other direction, let T =
{(ψ1, r1), . . . (ψm, rm)} and assume T |=L (ϕ, r). By Lemma 14, T ∗ |=G ϕ,
and by completeness of Go¨del logic, T ∗ `G ϕ. Finally, by Lemma 13,
T `PGL (ϕ,min(r1, . . . , rm)).
2
9. Some complexity issues
Let L ∈ {NG0(C), NKD(C), NRG(C), NΠG(C)}. We begin by showing that,
whenever we fix the set of propositional variables, the satisfiability problem for
L is decidable in polynomial time.
Theorem 16. Let Φ a formula in the L-language with n propositional variables.
Then, checking the satisfiability of Φ is a problem decidable in polynomial time.
Proof: We just deal with NG0(C); the other cases are similar and left to the
reader.
Following the completeness proof, satisfiability of Φ in NG0(C) is equiva-
lent to the satisfiability of a theory in G∆(C) obtained as translation from Φ
as follows. Let Φ? be obtained from Φ by replacing every occurrence of an
atomic subformula of the form Nϕ by a new propositional variable pϕ. Then,
inductively define the mapping ? from modal formulas into G∆(C)-formulas as
follows:
- (N(ϕ))? = pϕ,
- (r)? = r,
- (Φ→ Ψ)? = Φ? → Ψ?,
- (∆(Φ))? = ∆(Φ?)
Let, therefore, Γ be the union of Φ? and F? defined as
F? = {Υ? | Υ is an instance of the axioms} ∪ {pϕ |`G∆(C) ϕ},
where all the non-modal formulas belong to Fn(G∆(C)), the G∆(C)-algebra of
equivalence classes of formulas over n generators modulo provable equivalence.
Notice that F? is a finite theory over G∆(C) whose language has as new propo-
sitional variables V ar′ = {pϕ | ϕ ∈ Fn(G∆(C))}. The cardinality of F? depends
only on the original number of variables n.
Now, checking the satisfiability of Φ over NG0(C) is equivalent to checking
the satisfiability of Φ? ∪ F? over G∆(C). Since the number of variables in
V ar′ is fixed once we fix n, we only need to consider a chain with |V ar′| + 1
elements. Then, in order to decide the computation problem for the satisfiability
of Φ? ∪F?, it is enough to calculate the truth table corresponding to a formula
over a (|V ar′| + 1)-valued G-chain, and hence it is linear in the length of the
formula. 2
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Notice that the above translation works whenever the number of variables is
fixed. The most interesting and general case, in which the number of variables
is not specified, still is an open problem.
Finally, as for the fragment PGL, it be can easily noticed that the problem
of deciding whether (ϕ, r) can be deduced from a finite theory T , i.e. whether
T `PGL (ϕ, r) holds true, is equivalent to deciding whether T ∗r `G ϕ holds true
in Go¨del logic, which is known to be a co-NP complete problem (see e.g. [24]).
10. Future Work
Several issues related to the logics we have introduced in this paper deserve
further investigation. These logics are not proper modal logics, since the no-
tion of well-formed formula excludes those formulas with occurrences of nested
modalities. Work in progress is devoted to the study of the Possibilistic Ne-
cessity Go¨del logic (PNG, for short), presented in [10]. PNG is a full fuzzy
modal logic for graded necessity over Go¨del logic, that is, a modal expansion
of the [0, 1]-valued Go¨del logic with a modality N such that the truth-value of
a formula Nϕ (in [0, 1]) can be interpreted as the degree of necessity of ϕ, ac-
cording to some suitable semantics. The language of PNG is defined as follows:
formulas of PNG are built from the set of G-formulas using G-connectives and
the operator N . Axioms of PNG are those of Go¨del logic plus the following
modal axioms:
1. N(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Nϕ→ Nψ).
2. Nψ ↔ NNψ.
3. ¬N0.
Deduction rules for PNG are Modus Ponens and Necessitation for N (from
ψ derive Nψ). These axioms and rules define a notion of proof `PNG in the
usual way. It would be worth to study in depth the relation between PNG and
the logic of Basic Necessity NG0(C) (and of some of its meaningful axiomatic
extensions). Since the logic PNG may only capture the logic of basic necessities,
additional axioms (and possibly operators as well) must be considered in order
to capture more specific families of necessities, as those related to axioms (NKD),
(NRG), (Π3) or the axiom (NΠ). For instance, a candidate axiom as the PNG
counterpart of (NKD) is
N(Nϕ ∨ ψ)↔ Nϕ ∨Nψ
and a candidate counterpart of (NRG) would be
N(Nϕ ∨ ψ)↔ ∼Nϕ→ Nψ
where ∼ is an additional involutive negation, and
Π(ϕ ∧Πψ)↔ Πϕ ∧Πψ
N(ϕ→ Nψ)↔ Πϕ→ Nψ
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would be candidate axioms for counterparts of (Π3) and (NΠ) respectively.
From the algebraic study of specific logics a general theory of the algebraiza-
tion of logics slowly emerged during the last century with the aim of obtaining
general results relating the properties of a logic with the properties of the class
of algebras (or algebra related structures) associated with it. The algebraizable
logics are purported to be the logics with the strongest possible link with their
natural class of algebras. A precise concept of algebraic semantics and of al-
gebraizable logic was introduced by Blok and Pigozzi in [5]. The main point
in Blok and Pigozzi’s concept of algebraic semantics comes from the realiza-
tion that the set of designated elements considered in the algebraic semantics of
known logics is in fact the set of solutions of an equation. Then, in the study of
a logic, we should find an equational way to define uniformly in every algebra a
set of designated elements in order to obtain an algebraic soundness and com-
pleteness theorem. In [10] we showed that PNG is finitely algebraizable and has
a strong completeness algebraic theorem. Future work will be devoted to study
further the algebraic semantics of PNG, the class of NG-algebras. From an alge-
braic point of view, it seems interesting also to investigate faithful NG-algebras
(see [10]) since they enjoy very nice properties.
As mentioned in Section 2, Go¨del propositional logic is an extension of the
Intuitionistic logic Int, by the axiom of prelinearity. Hence, necessity-valued
Go¨del logics could be regarded as extensions of the Intuitionistic Modal Logic
IntK2, which is axiomatized by adding to Int axioms K, 2(p∧ q)↔ (2p∧2q)
and 2> and whose deduction rules are Modus Ponens and Necessitation for
2. The logic IntK2 and its extensions were introduced and investigated in
different articles, among them [31], [7], [33] and [30]. Kripke-style models for
intuitionistic modal logics using two accessibility relations between worlds, one
of which is intuitionistic and the other one modal, were introduced in [33],
and a completeness theorem for IntK2 using this semantics and the standard
canonical model technique, can be found in [11]. In the future we would like
to explore the relationship between the logics introduced in this paper and
fragments of well-know many-valued modal logics in the literature (see e.g. [6]).
Among them, specially relevant for our research are the Go¨del modal logics
studied by Caicedo and Rodr´ıguez in [9].
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